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Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS), created in 1992 and directed by Stefano 
Bartolini since September 2006, aims to develop inter-disciplinary and comparative research and to 
promote work on the major issues facing the process of integration and European society. 
The Centre is home to a large post-doctoral programme and hosts major research programmes and 
projects, and a range of working groups and ad hoc initiatives. The research agenda is organised 
around a set of core themes and is continuously evolving, reflecting the changing agenda of European 
integration and the expanding membership of the European Union.  
Details of the research of the Centre can be found on:  
http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Research/ 
Research publications take the form of Working Papers, Policy Papers, Distinguished Lectures and 
books. Most of these are also available on the RSCAS website:  
http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Publications/ 
The EUI and the RSCAS are not responsible for the opinion expressed by the author(s).  
 
The Global Governance Programme at the EUI 
The Global Governance Programme (GGP) is research turned into action. It provides a European 
setting to conduct research at the highest level and promote synergies between the worlds of research 
and policy-making, to generate ideas and identify creative and innovative solutions to global 
challenges. 
The GGP comprises three core dimensions: research, policy and training. Diverse global governance 
issues are investigated in research strands and projects coordinated by senior scholars, both from the 
EUI and from other internationally recognized top institutions. The policy dimension is developed 
throughout the programme, but is highlighted in the GGP High-Level Policy Seminars, which bring 
together policy-makers and academics at the highest level to discuss issues of current global 
importance.The Academy of Global Governance (AGG) is a unique executive training programme 
where theory and “real world” experience meet. Young executives, policy makers, diplomats, 
officials, private sector professionals and junior academics, have the opportunity to meet, share views 
and debate with leading academics, top-level officials, heads of international organisations and senior 
executives, on topical issues relating to governance. 
 






In this paper, we consider the development of Nigeria as a regional security actor, and the extent to 
which it shows security leadership in two dimensions: the sub-region West Africa, and in the whole of 
Africa. Whereas we contribute to studies that show, this paper provides a more nuanced assessment of 
the perceptions of Nigeria’s regional role. We argue that Nigeria’s dual regional role is a carefully 
constructed narrative that is central to its foreign policy objectives, and indeed its identity as an 
African state. The implication of this is that on the one hand borne out in Nigeria’ regional 
performance vis-à-vis the Economic Community for West African States (ECOWAS), which we 
explore in nuanced detailed. On the other hand, however, we also consider how Nigeria’s sub-regional 
performance, the usual focus of academic discourse unfolds in the context of its pan-African 
commitments. In doing so, we highlight the various tensions that underscore and challenge Nigeria’s 
role as a regional (African) leader. In particular, we examine claims of hegemonic ambitions, the 
impact of on-going national security challenges, the potential competition between Nigeria and others 
for leadership, and the role of external actors in discourses around who is a regional actor. 
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Nigeria plays a role in regional security governance at two levels: at the sub-regional level in West 
Africa and at the continental level of Africa. These two roles are interlinked and can reinforce each 
other. They are nevertheless different to the extent that Nigeria is the clear regional leader in West 
Africa where it is at the origin of, and dominates, the security architecture; while it is competing as a 
leader at the African level. In this chapter, we evaluate the construction of Nigeria as a regional actor 
on these two levels, highlighting how the material gap between Nigeria and other West African states, 
in addition to its normative foresight has helped secure its leadership position – even though internal 
issues make this leadership fragile. While in Africa, Nigeria has to contend with other regional leaders 
with different interests in, and perceptions of security governance in the continent.  
In the first part of this paper we analyze Nigeria’s security perceptions in West Africa and Africa 
before evaluating its sources of power and limits in a second part. The third part is dedicated to an 
analysis of Nigeria’s security governance policies at both level, mainly through the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union (AU). Lastly, we assess the 
mode and impact of Nigeria’s leadership on regional security governance. 
1. Nigeria’s security perceptions: West Africa and Africa  
Nigeria’s security perceptions should be analyzed within Nigeria’s historical context since its 
independence to understand how this participates to the shaping of its contemporary representations of 
security issues.  
a) Nigeria’s Security Perceptions: Vulnerability and Leadership 
Nigeria’s perception of security, framed in the West African and, to a lesser extent, in the African, 
context have been historically characterized by three interconnected elements: a sense of vulnerability; 
a strong representation of the connection between national and (sub)regional security; the perceived 
necessity to be the guarantor of West Africa’s stability, and to be its leader as well as Africa’s regional 
leader. 
In examining the discourses of Nigerian diplomatic and military officials, politicians, and scholars, 
there is evidence of an established nexus between national and regional security: perceived national 
threats also have transnational or regional dimensions; conversely, (sub)regional security is deemed as 
having a potential effect on national security and stability. The former Nigerian Minister of Defense, 
Dr. Haliru Mohammed Bello (2012, p.8) articulates this by citing Nigerian national defense policy 
objectives as including the ‘security and stability in the West African sub-region through collective 
security.’ Similarly, in a speech at Chatham House, former Minister of Defense, Dr. Erelu Olusola 
Obada (2013), defines ‘regional security, by way of combatting terrorism and other transnational 
crimes’ as being of strategic interest to Nigeria. She further reiterates that ‘internal fragilities, illegal 
trafficking, piracy, unreported and unregulated fishing, Islamic fundamentalism, oil theft and pipeline 
vandalism as well as terrorism’ often are ‘transnational in nature.’ This official narrative is also 
recurrent in the work of Nigerian scholars (Bah 2005, p. 78; see also Fawole 2008, p.106), thus 
contributing to the broader discourse on this connection between national and regional security 
represented as inseparable. 
This nexus can be understood to some extent by looking at the history of Nigeria since its 
independence in 1960. At independence, the Nigerian armed forces were minimal at best, as the 
expectation of war, which required a defensive force was very low (Fawole 2008, p. 97). In 
subsequent years, safeguards locked into the continental Organization for African Unity ensured that 
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should such a possibility arise, other African states were ready to defend against foreign incursion. 
Rather, the military turned inward to the task of governance over defense with successive military 
governments. 
The civil war (1967-70)
1
 radically changed the security thinking of Nigeria, by exposing a 
vulnerability that did not exist before. Several factors highlighted these vulnerabilities obvious of 
which was the ability of the Southeastern region to secede from the Federal state. Further, and as Obi 
(2008, p. 184) highlights, the potential for foreign incursion can exist outside of direct attack. In this 
case, France was able to use its former colonies such as Cote d’Ivoire to influence the Nigerian 
political situation by supporting the Biafran secessionists. It is not surprising then that at the end of the 
war, Nigeria sought to mend ties with its neighbors quickly by maintaining close relations with them 
in the hopes of being able to control events as they unfold in West Africa.  
Thus, from the 1970s, a ‘new phase emerged in the country’s security thinking that connected its 
national interests in the post-decolonization period with aspirations for regional leadership’ and the 
intention to create a sphere of influence where its national security could be guaranteed (Obi 2008, p. 
188). The new sense of vulnerability and the consequent need to protect itself against extra-regional 
power led to the assertion of the country as the regional leader or ‘big brother’ of the region which is a 
common metaphor used by Nigerian officials (Adebajo 2011, p. 13; Nigerian political official 2013b; 
ECOWAS military officer 2013a). This new stance was also enabled by the recent oil wealth of the 
country, used to finance this ambition.  
The creation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 1975, including 
all West African states, was also a response to this situation. The perception within the Nigerian 
diplomatic corps, armed forces, political circles, and within the academic community was that France 
was a divisive influence within the region especially against Nigeria (Osuntokun 2008, p. 144; Fawole 
2008, p. 99). ECOWAS was therefore conceived to undertake a rapprochement with Francophone 
countries in West Africa in a forum where Nigeria would be the undisputable leader.  
The cautiousness of Nigeria towards French influence remains even now when relations with 
France are better. Recent French intervention in Côte d’Ivoire and Mali reveals that Nigeria is only 
tolerant of France inasmuch as it can support regional stability but treat its engagement as a ‘necessary 
evil’ given the strong aversion to extra-regional powers in the region (Ohia 2013). 
The narrative of security constructed by Nigeria is thus a response to the above vulnerabilities and 
focused on the idea of a ‘Pax Nigeriana’, a term coined by former Nigerian Minister of Foreign Affairs 
(1985-87), Bolaji Akinyemi. ‘Pax Nigeriana’ was derived from the similar ‘Pax Africana’
2
 justifying 
the leadership role Nigeria has ascribed to itself in Africa (Adebajo 2011, p. 12). The narrative of ‘Pax 
Nigeriana’ is further grounded in Nigeria’s foreign and security policy thinking: the concentric circles 
doctrine. According to Gambari (2011, p. 70), former Nigerian Minister of Foreign Affairs, who 
promoted its formal adoption in 1984, the national interests of Nigeria are based on four concentric 
circles: 1/Nigeria and his direct neighbors; 2/ECOWAS; 3/Continental African issues; 4/The 
international stage. This still guides Nigeria’s foreign and security policy even though it has not 
resulted in concerted strategies. The consequence of this lack of strategic grounding is that while 
regional security is at the core of Nigeria’s foreign policy, there is no clear reflection on how this can 
precisely serve Nigeria’s national interests. One political leader acutely reflects this lack of clarity, 
stating (of Nigeria’s interests): ‘Politically speaking we are regional leaders, it is important to ensure 
                                                     
1
 The Nigerian civil war, also known as the Biafra War, started with the secession of the Southeastern provinces of Nigeria 
under the name of the Republic of Biafra. The war started in 1967 when the Nigerian government launched an operation 
to recover the seceding territories. They succeeded in 1970. 
2
 Pax Africana according to eminent Africanist scholar Ali Mazrui (1967) is the idea that Africans need to take 
responsibility for the continent’s peace and security. 
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the stability of the region, it has to be so’ (Nigerian political official 2013b).
3
 Yet, it is in this vague 
concentric framework that Nigeria defines security threats, especially threats it perceives as having 
local and transnational dimensions. 
b) Nigeria’s Perception of Contemporary Security Threats 
Nigeria’s perceptions of its main security risks have generally and openly been articulated as having 
these two main dimensions: the national (local) and the regional (transnational). In addition, Nigeria 
views responses to these risks and threats as necessitating cooperation with other states, in a context 
where it is visible as taking leadership for and in (West) Africa.  
Presently, the most pressing security challenge according to Nigerian officials and as presented in 
official documents is terrorism. They refer to the national dimension of terrorism citing the activities 
of the Islamist sect Boko Haram in the Northeast of the country. The local-transnational dimension is 
especially evident here. Whereas Boko Haram is best understood in the local and historical context of 
(Northern) Nigeria, there is also evidence of close connections with Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb 
(AQIM) operating in the Sahel, an internationally recognized terrorist group. Nigerian officials in 
particular emphasize this transnational dimension in order to underscore the relevance of regional 
cooperation, and integration of security apparatuses particularly in West Africa. Nigeria is especially 
determined to foster border cooperation with neighboring countries and continue to engage in regional 
armed missions through ECOWAS as evidenced by the intervention in Mali in 2013.
4
 Nigerian 
Minister of Defense Obada (2013, p. 4) and other members of the political and military establishment 
underscore the potential for spill-over from Mali in terms of weapon circulation and radicalization 
(Nigerian political official 2013a; Nigerian military officer 2013a) if Nigeria did not support and 
undertake an intervention.  
However, other regional actors like South Africa are less concerned with the issue of terrorism, 
which does not impact as much on their sub-regional security dynamics. Consequently, there is a 
tendency for competing security priorities and perceptions at the continental level. We see this for 
example in Libya during the last days of Colonel Ghadafi where South Africa and Nigeria did not 
seem to agree on the cause of action. Nigeria supported the NATO airstrikes citing responsibility to 
protect as being a greater imperative, while South Africa was reticent about the engagement of non-
African countries. This ‘battle’ happened within the AU causing many to question the extent to which 
the AU can be an effective actor if its most prominent members diverge. Beyond the difference in 
security perceptions – with Nigeria concerned with the risk of spillover of the Libyan conflict – it was 
also a question of competition for continental leadership.
5
 
Other overlapping security transnational security threats which constitute priorities for Nigeria as 
well as for the continent as a whole include organized criminality including drug, and small arms and 
                                                     
3
 This lack of clearly defined framework for Nigeria’s engagement in the region could weaken its commitment. Indeed, 
Nigerian citizens are increasingly skeptical towards this engagement seen as draining money away from pressing 
economic and social challenges, as well as from internal security issues. 
4
 In January 2012, secessionist Tuareg groups in Northern Mali launched a rebellion against the central government. The 
rebellion was soon taken over by Islamist groups such as AQIM and Ansar Dine. After the rebellion started threatening 
the capital Bamako, the French government launched a military intervention in January 2013 in support of the Malian 
government. They were soon joined by an African-led mission (AFISMA) under the command of Nigeria and now 
replaced by a United Nations mission (MINUSMA). 
5
 This competition has been obvious in many other occasions. South Africa and Nigeria also seemed to have been at 
opposite sides of the most recent crisis in Cote d’Ivoire with South Africa supporting incumbent Laurent Gbabgbo while 
Nigeria and the international community backed Alassane Ouattara the recognized winner of the elections. Further, while 
Nigeria has sought a permanent seat on the United Nations (UN) Security Council, South Africa has steadily blocked this 
possibility. In retaliation, Nigeria actively opposed to the replacement of AU former chief, Jean Ping by Dlamini-Zuma 
after his initial term. 
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light weapons (SALW) trafficking. ECOWAS identifies them as major threats (Convention on SALW; 
Political declaration on Drug Abuse, Illicit Drug Trafficking and Organized Crimes in West Africa) 
and the AU (Plan of Action on Drug Control). On the one hand, drug use itself is seen as a challenge 
to public health; but trafficking in drugs also is also viewed as a facilitating criminality in countries in 
Central, East and West Africa that support the transit of drugs from South America and Asia to Europe 
and North America. West Africa is noted as the transit point for cocaine from South America 
(UNODC, 2013).  
The pervasiveness of small arms all over Africa is viewed by many as being directly linked to the 
intensity of various types of conflicts within and between African states, and banditry of which 
Nigeria is not exempt. There is the fear, for instance, that SALW trafficking nourishes the conflict in 
the Niger Delta where most of Nigeria’s oil is located. All the crimes concerning oil (smuggling, theft, 
pipeline vandalism) committed by militant groups, organized crime networks or mere every-day 
criminality, are presented as being very costly to the country’s economy (Nigerian military officer 
2013a; Obada 2013, p4). 
All these threats constitute security challenges that underscore vulnerability and the necessity for 
regional stability. Importantly, these threats extend beyond traditional security concerns to address 
new security challenges with implications for both political stability and economic livelihoods. The 
connection between national and (sub)regional security is thus recurrent in Nigerian security 
discourses. 
2. Nigeria’s strength and weaknesses: from material capabilities to political legitimacy 
Nigeria’s status as a regional leader is based on the material (economic, demographic and military) 
gap existing between the country and the majority of other African states, in particular within West 
Africa where it is the most powerful state according to these indicators.
6
 However, this gap hides the 
material fragilities of Nigeria. Further, its power in Africa does not only stem from material sources; 
its source of power is also political through the legitimacy it gained with its actions at the sub-regional 
and regional levels. 
Nigeria’s economy is the biggest in West Africa where it represents around 75% of the economic 
strength of the sub-region, and the second biggest in Africa after South Africa (Adebajo 2008, p. 12). 
The expansion of Nigeria’s economy reached its highest level in the 1970s with the oil wealth that 
followed the discovery of oil in 1956 in the Niger Delta and the oil crisis in 1973. This enabled the 
state to assert its status in the sub-region through ‘oil diplomacy’ – providing oil to its neighbors at 
concessionary rates and economic assistance (Adebajo 2008, p. 9); funding 70% of ECOWAS budget, 
as well as financing and providing the vast majority of the armed forces for the Economic Community 
of West African States Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) missions in Liberia and Sierra 
Leone at a moment, in the beginning of the 90s, where neither the United Nations nor the USA were 
willing to intervene in Africa (Bah 2005, pp. 78-79; Francis 2006, p. 13-14). At the continental level, 
Nigeria supported the fight against the Apartheid in South Africa and other liberation the other 
liberation movements (see speech by Oliver Tambo, 1977). Hence, Nigeria emerged in the 70s as one 
of the richest countries in Africa and used actively its economic strength to support its foreign policy 
and political status in the continent for which it obtained regional and international recognition.
7
 
                                                     
6
 According to the National Power Index (index weighting factors of GDP, defense spending, population, and technology), 
Nigeria is the first state in Africa in percentage of the total global power share. As of 2012, it was 0.83%, followed by 
Egypt (0,61%), then South Africa (0.55%) and Algeria (0.38%). The forecast until 1960 indicates that Nigeria would 
keep the first place. 
7
 This political legitimacy is nevertheless limited by the criticisms addressed to its political system and the respect of the 
political and civil rights of its citizens. According to Freedom House (2013), Nigeria’s status is a ‘partially free’ country 
with a freedom ranking of 4,5 (7 being the worst on the scale). 
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Today, it is the 12
th
 largest oil producer in the world, according to the US Energy Information 
Administration (2012), and the first one in Africa (2013, p. 1); while it possesses the largest natural 
gas reserves in the continent and it is the world’s fourth leading exporter of liquefied natural gas 
(LNG) (2013, p.1). It has a fast growing economy with an annual growth rate averaging over 8% 




 In addition, its 
population is estimated at 168,8 million in 2012 by the World Bank (WB) which represents one fifth 
of the African population and almost half of the West African population; thus constituting a large 
reserve of human resources.  
These facts nevertheless hide two major problems. Its economy relies mostly on oil exports to an 
extent of 95%, which makes it dependent on the fluctuation of oil prices (World Bank 2013, p. 8). 
Already in the 80s, following the decrease of oil prices, Nigeria plunged in an economic crisis and 
became heavily indebted to Western bilateral donor and international financial institutions. 
Consequently, it had to decrease its assistance to neighbors and lower its political role in the sub-
region and in Africa (Adebajo 2008, p. 11). Whereas today its economy is developing, it is still largely 
inefficient. Gambari (2008, p. 61) points to the role of the incredibly rich Nigerian elite involved in 
corruption and rent-seeking activities, lacking the motivation to diversify the economy.  
Moreover, the impressive economic growth rate and oil wealth of Nigeria conceals the level of 
poverty and important social inequalities: in the UNDP Human Development Index 2012, Nigeria 
ranks 153 among 186 countries. This situation stems partly from corruption and the very unequal 
redistribution of oil income. Social inequalities have a negative impact on the cohesion and stability of 
the country as they nourish the tensions between regions and ethnic groups. For instance, in the region 
of the Niger Delta where most of the oil is located, militant groups consistently demand a better 
redistribution of oil wealth sometimes though violent actions, affecting oil production.
 
Overall, it 
creates a climate of insecurity throughout the country, unfavorable to economic development, but also 
to Nigeria’s regional leadership. Indeed, beyond the fact that a drop in oil income would undermine its 
foreign policy, there is a perception among the citizenry that the government spends more on regional 
stability at the expense of tackling poverty and inequalities (Nigerian political official 2013b; 
ECOWAS official 2013). The climate of insecurity in this region and in the North of the country led to 
the mobilization of the armed forces to pacify these areas at the cost of more vigorous engagement in 
regional interventions such as in Mali. Conversely, these national security issues also provide an 
incentive for the government to get involved in regional security as transnational organized criminality 
and crises in neighboring countries – through an increased flow of weapon for instance – contribute to 
feed these local conflicts. 
This industrial inefficiency of Nigeria has an impact on the defense industry. According to Fawole 
(2008, p. 111), it merely produces light arms and ammunition, lacking even the basic technology for 
the production of heavy weapons and vehicles. The Nigerian army is therefore well trained (Alli 2012, 
p. 11) but under-equipped and its modernization rate rather slow.
9
 The lack of professionalization and 
the corruption of the armed forces are also often criticized by analysts and scholars (Adebajo 2008, 
p.11; Fawole 2008, p. 110; see also Thurston 2012, p. 10). 
Nevertheless, the picture is not so negative. Since the civilian administration of Obasanjo (1999-
2007) an effort is made at modernizing and professionalizing the armed forces; for instance, through 
cooperation with the US military (Fawole 2008, p. 111). In 2013, the Nigerian government decided to 
increase its defense budget by providing 31 billion dollars to defense with the aim of reaching 4,76 
billion in 2016 (DefenceWeb, 12 July 2012). 
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 However, it is still behind South Africa, which is the 28th world economy (World Bank 2012). 
9
 According to the SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 1988-2012 Nigeria only spent 1% of its GDP on defense in 2012 
amounting to 21 billion dollars. South Africa spent 1,1% of its GDP amounting to 47,85 billion dollars. Compared to 
other African countries such as Algeria which spent 4,4% of its GDP or other regional/emerging powers such as Brazil 
(1,5%), India (2,6%), China (2%), Russia (4,1%) or Turkey (2,3%), it is not a considerable amount. 
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In any case, Nigeria remains the only country in West Africa whose armed forces were able to 
intervene in the various crises and civil wars arising in the sub-region since the beginning of the 90s. 
In 2013 they were also the main contingent of the AFISMA force in Mali together with the Chadian 
troops which joined later the mission. However, this most recent mission also revealed the lack of 
equipment and poor preparation of the Nigerian armed forces, which faced many criticisms pointing to 
their slow and difficult deployment (Adebajo 2013; Ibekwe 2013a; Ibekwe 2013b). 
3. Nigeria’s Role in Regional Security Governance  
While we contend that Nigeria’s role in regional security happens both at the sub-regional and 
continental levels, its role within the sub-region, provides the crucial foundation for all other security 
activities. 
a) Nigeria in West Africa: ECOWAS 
We should emphasize here that Nigeria’s quest to assert regional leadership has translated into a 
strong engagement in the security governance of the sub-region, especially when armed intervention is 
necessary. If we take the regional security policy areas classified in Kirchner and Dominguez (2011) 
(‘assurance’, ‘prevention’, ‘protection’ and ‘compellence’) as a point of departure for analyzing 
regional security governance, Nigeria, mainly through ECOWAS, plays very active roles in these 
areas with the following aims: to launch regional actions in cases of crisis; to develop normative 
frameworks for security governance; and to promote conflict prevention measures and democracy. 
Nigeria is central here as it dominates ECOWAS in terms of funding and human resources – noting 
that the headquarters of ECOWAS are in the Nigerian capital, Abuja –, and shapes ECOWAS’ 
decision-making process. 
The most noticeable dimension of ECOWAS’ action in regional security is in the area of 
‘compellence’ given the extent to which this has played a role in legitimating the organization. In 
1990, an ad hoc instrument, the ECOMOG, was created to respond to the civil war in Liberia. It 
subsequently intervened in Sierra Leone (1991), Guinea-Bissau (1998-99), Cote d’Ivoire (2002), and 
Liberia (2003) under the leadership of Nigeria. For these missions, Nigeria provided between 70 and 
80 percent of the troop contributions, and 80-90% of the funding (Obi 2008, p. 190; Alli 2012, p. 54). 
Today, an ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF) is being created within the framework of the AU. In 2012, 
the ECOWAS Authority within a broader African framework authorized the deployment of a 
contingent of the ESF to Guinea-Bissau, following the April military coup, to assist in securing the 
transitional process (ECOWAS Press Release 2012b). This was very much the initiative of Nigeria 
wanting to disengage the Angolan troops already present on the ground and perceived as a competition 
to its leadership. An uneasy compromise was reached on these following negotiations in the context of 
the AU. In Mali, ECOWAS launched the AFISMA that started deploying beginning of 2013. It was 
placed under the command of Nigeria which was one of its main advocate, and aims at helping restore 
democracy and fight the rebellion in the North of the country (ECOWAS Press Release 2012a). One 
notable exception to Nigeria’s contributions was the refusal to send troops as part of the Guinea-
Bissau mission, which ended up being a significant failure for the ECOMOG mission. This seems to 
demonstrate that Nigeria’s participation is important to mission success (Adebajo 2008, p. 21; Alli 
2012, p. 51). Nigeria took advantage of the security vacuum left by the international community in the 
wake of the many conflicts in the immediate post-Cold War period to intervene in order to further its 
security, but also to assert its role as leader in this regional context (Iwilade & Agbo 2012, p. 364).  
Since the deployment of the initial ECOMOG missions, ECOWAS has been developing a 
permanent institutional and normative framework to address security challenges, which can be 
subsumed under the ‘assurance’ and ‘prevention’ areas of Kirchner and Dominguez (2011)’s 
classification. This institutional and normative framework can be traced back to the Mechanism for 
Nigeria and Regional Security 
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Conflict Prevention Management, Resolution, Peace-keeping and Security (1999) until the more 
recent Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance (2001), and ECOWAS Conflict 
Prevention Framework (ECPF) (2008). These texts are important as they reflect the move of regional 
security governance beyond strict sovereignty – invoking the responsibility to protect, interventions in 
case of serious threats to peace and security, and strict sanctions to respond to unconstitutional 
changes of government in a member state. They also indicate a turn towards a less traditional vision of 
security, increasingly centered on human security. The leadership of Nigeria was crucial here, as this 
transformation from the non-interference principle could not be done without its acceptance and 
impulse as the most powerful state in the sub-region. 
More precisely, ‘assurance’, on the one hand, mostly takes the form of systematic electoral 
assistance missions each time an election takes place in one of ECOWAS member states like in Togo 
and Ivory Coast in 2010, or in Niger in 2011. On the other hand, ‘prevention’ is a strong dimension of 
Nigeria and ECOWAS’ action in West Africa with an ECOWAS Early Warning System,
10
 as well as 
recurrent sanctions and mediation efforts. Niger was for instance suspended by ECOWAS following 
the military coup in 2010. At the beginning of May 2012, the ECOWAS Authority imposed 
diplomatic, economic and financial sanctions against the junta in Guinea Bissau that seized power in 
the 12th April military coup. Moreover, Nigeria’s leaders, often acting on behalf of ECOWAS, are 
very active in terms of mediation to resolve crises and conflicts in the sub-region: from the Lomé 
Peace Agreement ending the Sierra Leone civil war in July 1999, to the 2005-06 crisis in Togo when 
the two main leaders were invited in Abuja and signed a peace accord, to the mediation of the electoral 
crisis in Senegal in 2012 among others (Alli 2012, pp. 55-57). Finally, in terms of arm control and 
circulation, ECOWAS developed a landmark initiative with its Moratorium on Small Arms and Light 
Weapons (SALW) in 1998, replaced in 2006 by a binding Convention on SALW. 
In the area of ‘protection’, ECOWAS took steps to develop a legal and normative framework to 
address transnational security issues with plans and strategies regarding various types of illicit 
trafficking: the Political Declaration and Action Plan against trafficking in human beings (2001), the 
Political declaration on Drug Abuse, Illicit Drug Trafficking and Organized Crimes in West Africa 
(2008) and its Action Plan. Moreover, a West African Police Chiefs Committee (WAPPCO) and an 
ECOWAS Committee of Chiefs of Defense Staff have been established and are very active, 
particularly the later one which got together once a month in the past year to exchange views and deal 
with the Malian crisis. High on the agenda are two new issues: counter-terrorism and maritime 
security (ECOWAS Authority 2013a; ECOWAS Authority 2013b). Nigeria is now strongly putting 
pressure for the adoption and implementation of regional strategies to deal with these challenges 
perceived as endangering its own security (Nigerian military officer 2013b). 
Further, Nigeria tries to exert its influence on West African armed forces. It has military attachés in 
many states of the sub-region such as Ghana, Benin, Liberia and Mali (Alli 2012, p. 47). It also uses 
its prominent institution, the National Defense College (NDC), to train high-level military officers 
from other member states since 1996. This further integration by promoting mutual knowledge and 
building trust, but also foster Nigeria’s role and influence (National Defense College official 2013; 
ECOWAS military officer 2013a). 
b) Nigeria in Africa: from the Organization of African Unity to the African Union 
Nigeria’s role as a security actor has also been framed so that it resonates beyond West Africa. Indeed, 
as we said, while West Africa provides the space to exercise its security prowess, there is arguably a 
                                                     
10
 The ECOWAS Early Warning System monitors West African peace and security according to a certain number of 
indicators relating to political, humanitarian and human security issues. It comprises an Observation and Monitoring 
Centre based at the ECOWAS Commission in Abuja, as well as four zonal bureaus in Gambia, Benin, Burkina Faso and 
Liberia transmitting the information.  
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carefully constructed narrative that places Nigeria as a leader within the whole continent. The 
emphasis on a transnational outlook, in part, explains Nigeria’s robust engagement in African security 
affairs especially since the creation of the African Union (AU).  
In the post-Cold War years especially, atrocities on the continent have encouraged Nigeira’s desire, 
if not action, to engage in Africa beyond West Africa. This is borne out in the extent to which Nigeria 
is encouraging the integration of ECOWAS security apparatus into the continental African Peace and 
Security Architecture (APSA). The APSA was created as the security apparatus of the African Union, 
which is the OAU’s successor. The APSA functions on the logic that the sub-regional groupings like 
ECOWAS constitute a building bloc of African security more generally. In this way, sub-regional and 
continental security is mutually constitutive. Further, this suggests that Nigeria’s broader role in Africa 
will, to a large extent be measured by its engagement in West Africa, albeit within an evolving 
mindset. Consequently, fitting Nigeria’s role in Africa within the rubric of ‘assurance’, ‘prevention’, 
‘protection’ and ‘compellence’ is mostly tied into the ECOWAS. 
Nigeria has been instrumental in creating these dimensions within the APSA. Its role within the 
APSA has helped to prioritize some of its own security threat perceptions including piracy and 
trafficking. More precisely, in the area of ‘compellence’, Nigeria has contributed to African missions 
like the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS), AU Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) and although never 
deployed, Nigeria initially committed troops to the AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB). While Nigeria’s 
role has been more limited on the continental stage, there are indications of a commitment to the still 
nascent APSA. To further contextualize this, as was mentioned above, Nigeria, has taken the lead in 
supporting the creation of a permanent ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF), a raid response and 
multidimensional team, which is in the process of being fully implemented. The creation of the ESF is 
part of the African Standby Force mandated within the continental Peace and Security Architecture. 
To date, the ESF lead by Nigeria shares the honor of being one of the most developed ones with the 
SADC Standby Force, led by South Africa. 
4. Nigerian leadership: what impact on regional security governance? 
Nigeria’s promotion and use of ECOWAS in the field of security is contributing to foster security 
cooperation between West African countries and to build a regional community through the 
elaboration of political and security norms and standards accepted by all the member states. At the 
continental level, Nigeria has had a clear voice in shaping the development of the APSA, using the 
successes of ECOWAS as a blueprint for the developing institution. In West Africa, ECOWAS is now 
a regional organization with a supranational dimension that greatly interferes in its member states. It 
has a series of plans, programs and strategies to deal with the whole range of security issues affecting 
the sub-region (Alli 2012, p. 46). Even though not fully elaborated yet, a new vision of security is 
being established throughout the region based on human security rather than on the traditional vision 
of security referring to states and the protection of their territory. Habits of sanctions, mediations, and 
electoral assistance are now assimilated by ECOWAS and its member states to respond to a wide array 
of situations. 
However, it is important to note that regional security governance also faces important problems 
and challenges. Indeed, the lack of institutional capabilities and financial resources of member states, 
as well as the very weak implementation of regional texts makes it difficult to move forward – in 
particular concerning transnational security issues such as illicit trafficking that require effective 
national implementation. The lack of capabilities also affects the operationalization of the ECOWAS 
Standby Force that is still not effectively on standby as was shown during the deployment in Mali. 
According to the officers interviewed at the ESF headquarter (ECOWAS military officer 2013a; 
ECOWAS military officer 2013b) member states’ lack of resources makes it impossible to have armed 
forces actually on standby. Hence, the political will, the armed forces and the financial resources of 
Nigeria are necessary to the functioning of regional security governance. The recent maritime security 
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strategy, for instance, in which Nigeria has a strong interest, is already being operationalized, whereas 
the Action Plan on drug trafficking has not been implemented since 2008. The risk here is that 
Nigeria’s internal security issues mobilize its armed forces and financial resources to the extent it 
cannot invest as much in regional security governance. Recently, Nigeria withdrew some troops from 
the MINUSMA
11
 in Mali to deal with Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria (Oyedele and Iroegbu 2013). 
Hence, Nigeria is the key state for regional security governance in West Africa. Its acceptance and 
promotion of regional norms and standards, and of the supranational dimension, implying the end of 
the non-interference principle which was so important for African states after independence, can be 
understood within the frame of Nigeria’s perceptions as analyzed in the first part of this paper. On the 
one hand, its ‘big brother’ syndrome and feeling of responsibility allow its involvement in sub-
regional events. On the other hand, the sense of vulnerability towards extra-regional power 
involvement and towards the spill-over of security threats across the sub-region is an incentive to build 
a community to insure its own protection. ECOWAS thus serves as a key instrument in providing 
Nigeria with a legitimacy that helps to mitigate perceptions of ‘hegemony’.  
To some extent, Nigeria also shares the burden of protecting the region with the international 
community. It is important to emphasize that most of ECOWAS security governance programs and 
initiatives as well as those of the AU are funded by extra-regional states or international organizations. 
In ECOWAS, the Community budget is allocated to the every-day functioning of the institutions. The 
European Union (EU) for instance is particularly prominent with its Regional Indicative Program 
providing 119 million euro to regional security governance (RIP 2008-2013). United Nations agencies 
have also been active in supporting regional security institutions in Africa. Partners such as the US or 
the UK are very interested in initiatives such as the Maritime Security and the Counter-terrorism 
strategies and often contribute towards programs geared towards piracy and counter-terrorism. The 
UK is for instance funding the officer working on the operationalization of the Maritime Security 
Strategy within the ECOWAS Commission. Similarly, the German Technical Development agency 
heavily supports the development of continental early warning systems, especially the integration of 
sub-regional early warning systems into a larger continental network. 
On the one hand, it is evident from this then, that Nigeria has its limitations which impinge on its 
material powers and its legitimacy as a regional actor and leader. The necessity of French 
interventions in Ivory Coast and most recently in Mali is illustrative of this limitation. On the other 
hand, the consequence of extra-regional involvement however is that what constitutes regional 
governance is influenced by ideas and ideals beyond (West) Africa. Various concepts such as ‘human 
security’, ‘comprehensive security’, ‘good governance’ are now well integrated in the (West) African 
discourses. ECOWAS and its officials are very permeable to these ideas as they seem to respond to the 
needs of the region, and to the extent they are in constant need of funding and support from the 
international community (Lopez Lucia, 2012).  
Finally, despite the commitments by Nigeria to an African level of security engagement, this is 
sometime prohibitive due mainly to the fact that the sub-regional security architectures that constitute 
the building blocs of the APSA are at different levels of evolutions. The unevenness has thus made it 
difficult to have a fully functional and integrated continental architecture. A second prohibition is the 
competition between Nigeria and South Africa which plays out at the continental level. This rivalry 
presents to the rest of the world a dysfunctional continental architecture, which challenges the viability 
of the AU and especially the APSA as these institutions depend heavily on external contributions. 
Undoubtedly, the ability to govern security at the continental level is jeopardized. 
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Conclusion 
We have shown that Nigeria is a clear participant, and sometimes leader in the governance of security 
in Africa. This role is emphatic in the West African region, where Nigeria through ECOWAS has 
contributed troops and other resources to military missions among other security activities. Moreover, 
Nigeria has consistently advocated to non-Africa partners on behalf African states for financial and 
hardware contributions to resolve conflicts and humanitarian emergencies.  
In this way, there is evidence that Nigeria is also shaping the trajectory of the APSA as one of the 
core members that reconstituted the OAU to create the AU. Yet, we also note that Nigeria’s role in 
regional security is challenged by a variety of issues that will not be overcome soon. This of course 
raises the question of how well Nigeria can continue to perform as a regional security actor, and what 
implications this may mean for African security at the sub-regional and continental levels. 
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